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1. Why should American Jews get involved in the debate around how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
2. Doesn’t it endanger Israel when American Jews advocate for US positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that differ from those of the standing Israeli government?
3. Didn’t the Palestinian rejection of Israel’s offer at Camp David in 2000, and the more recent launching of Qassam rockets from the evacuated Gaza Strip, prove that the policy of “land for peace” can’t work?
4. How can Israel agree to negotiate with the Palestinians when there is no real “partner for peace” on the Palestinian side?
5. What evidence is there that even if an agreement is reached, a Palestinian leader will be able to uphold it?
6. If the majority of Palestinians are sincere in their desire for a two state solution, why was Hamas victorious in legislative elections in January 2006?
7. Is it too late for a two-state solution? Is a one-state solution a viable alternative to the two-state solution?
8. What is the position of the other Arab countries on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how can they contribute to its resolution?
9. Why is the US such an important player in the conflict and what can they do to bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians?
10. Are there Arab and Palestinian peace groups comparable to Brit Tzedek v’Shalom?

1. Why should American Jews get involved in the debate around how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Many in the American Jewish community feel a strong connection to the state of Israel as the national or spiritual home of the Jewish people, a haven from anti-Semitism, the native home of family members, and so many other personal associations.  As such they have a link to Israel in religious, ethnic and cultural terms that no other constituency in America can claim.  

Historically Diaspora Jewry has been involved with domestic Israeli politics, starting with the establishment of the state. Indeed, it’s possible that without American Jewish activism, the United States might not have voted in favor of the UN partition plan that created Israel.  

The current US-Israel relationship and American Jewry’s role in it has evolved over several decades.  Concurrently, the US has become increasingly important in affecting the politics of the Middle East, especially when it comes to Israeli political and military policies.

The nature of the relationship between Israel and American Jews (and all Diaspora Jews for that matter) means the community often has passionate views about how best to act in the interests of the Israeli people, sparking debate and discussion from a wide range of voices.  However, to the detriment of those would actively seek a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the full spectrum of voices has not been reflected in the most powerful American Jewish lobby.  The mainstream Jewish institutions have tended to base their support around strong financial military and economic aid, and supporting Israel in times of crisis, and through uncritical support for Israeli government policies.   

Brit Tzedek believes that we must move beyond this narrow focus to encourage US engagement in bringing a peaceful solution to the conflict, critical for the well-being of Israelis, Palestinians, and world Jewry alike.  Resolving the conflict will allow Israelis and Palestinians to heal from the trauma of war in peaceful coexistence.   Jews throughout the world will be able to identify with our Jewish connection to Israel outside of the bitterness the conflict has engendered.

2. Doesn’t it endanger Israel when American Jews advocate for US positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that differ from those of the standing Israeli government?

Just as in Israel, where the political spectrum is comprised of a broad range of political agendas, the positions of the American Jewish community on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also var\y greatly.. Indeed, in both countries the freedom to engage in public debate is at the core of these societies’ democratic values.  It is only natural, then, that not all American Jews will always agree with the positions of those parties heading the Israeli government at a given time.  American Jewish organizations from left to right have publicly disagreed with or opposed Israeli policies at different times.  AIPAC, for example, did not initially support the Gaza withdrawal while it was official Israeli policy.  As American Jews, we must be allowed to take positions on issues that are commonplace in Israel’s own debate.

Brit Tzedek maintains that it is incumbent on American Jewry to speak up on those positions that represent what are best for Israel and that we should not censor ourselves on an issue we care about so deeply. Blindly supporting policies that are detrimental to Israel’s well-being, such as settlement expansion or refusal to negotiate, endangers the country, while healthy debate will allow Israelis to find the best possible answers to their difficulties.

Our position that Israel’s long term security depends on achieving a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is recognized at the highest levels of U.S. and Israeli government, as well as by the majority of Israelis themselves.  We stand with millions of Israelis and numerous Israeli political leaders who are themselves unable to speak directly to American decision makers.

3. Why does Brit Tzedek advocate for a negotiated two-state solution to the conflict? Didn’t the Palestinian rejection of Israel’s offer at Camp David in 2000, and the more recent launching of Qassam rockets from the evacuated Gaza Strip, prove that the policy of “land for peace” can’t work?

Many of those involved with the 2000 Camp David talks, (Israeli, American and Palestinian alike), have reported that the failure to reach an agreement was a result of actions on both sides, and that the Israeli offer was less straightforward than we have subsequently been told.  However, during President Clinton’s last weeks in office, he was able to bridge the differences between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat that led to the breakdown of negotiations.  The “Clinton Parameters”, as they are known, were accepted by both sides and participants in subsequent talks held in Taba, Egypt reported that they were weeks away from achieving an agreement when both Clinton and Barak left office bringing negotiations to a standstill. Regardless, the proposals still stand today as a viable avenue to the resumption of peace talks. Indeed, the eventual reconvening of diplomatic negotiations will not start from scratch, but will be based on the substantial progress already made.  

Moreover, since 2000, officials from the Fatah party (led since Arafat’s death by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas), have maintained a positive attitude toward the possibility of resuming diplomatic contacts with Israel, and have publicly reiterated their recognition of the Jewish State.  Likewise, polls show again and again that both Israelis and Palestinians support the achievement of a two-state solution.  

The escalating violence of the second intifada and the barrage of Qassam rocket fire from Gaza serve not as an indictment of a land-for-peace approach, but as a cautionary tale about what can happen in the absence of negotiations: Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza was carried out unilaterally, without any coordination whatsoever with the moderate, Fatah-led Palestinian Authority Israel disengaged from Gaza, but without any agreement as to what it was to receive in return or formal mechanisms with which to address potential grievances.

On the other hand, Israel’s agreements with Jordan and Egypt, once enemies of the Jewish State, prov ide living proof of the efficacy of negotiations. The latter involved an enormous exchange of land for peace, and both have stood the test of time so well that the two Arab nations were at the forefront of mediation efforts during Israel’s 2007 war in Lebanon.

In fact, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert himself has acknowledged unilateralism as a failed policy, saying in a January 2007 interview, "A year ago, I believed that we would be able to [withdraw from the West Bank] unilaterally. However, it should be said that our experience in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip is not encouraging….Under the existing circumstances, it would be more practical to achieve a two-state solution through negotiations rather than [unilateral] withdrawal."  

Only a negotiated accord, with concrete terms that provide for Israel’s security ,is capable of providing lasting peace on Israel’s borders. The basic framework for such an agreement has already been established and the majority of both Israelis and Palestinians desire its realization.

4. How can Israel agree to negotiate with the Palestinians when there is no real “partner for peace” on the Palestinian side?

The term “partner for peace” generally references an Israeli expectation that potential Palestinian negotiators must agree to certain preconditions before talks can take place.  However, there are numerous precedents in Israeli history in which Israeli leaders had diplomatic contact with Arab leaders for whom no preconditions were set, and who did not, in fact recognize the State’s existence –or were furthermore sworn to its destruction. Israel’s first peace agreement was achieved with Egypt, the country that had previously been its single most dangerous enemy. In the course of negotiating the Camp David Accords, no demand was made that Egypt recognize Israel or its right to exist. The Oslo Peace Process, an initially secret series of talks between official Israeli and PLO representatives, was launched in advance of Palestinian recognition of Israel. Indeed, at the time, the PLO’s National Covenant still called on the Palestinian people “to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine.”  (Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition in 1993, at which point the PLO also committed to amending its covenant; the covenant was officially amended in 1996) Additionally, Israel did not require Jordan to “recognize” it prior to the Israel-Jordan peace agreement in 1994.

Rather than keeping Israel safe, preconditions unnecessarily impede diplomatic progress and an end to war. Under the “no partner” mantra, Israel eschewed bi-lateral relations with Arafat during his last years in power and with the moderate Mahmoud Abbas when he took over the PLO and PA, pursuing instead a unilateral course of action – the result being a complete breakdown of security in the Gaza Strip and regular Qassam rocket attacks on Israel’s south. As a result, Israel was forced in November 2006 to reach a ceasefire in Gaza with the Hamas-led PA – ironically achieving with the radical militant group Hamas, the very option Ariel Sharon refused to consider with the moderate Abbas in August 2005.  These circumstances have shown that the “partner for peace” notion is deployed when politically expedient, and shelved when reaching an agreement with Israel’s enemies is absolutely necessary.
 
5 What evidence is there that even if an agreement is reached, a Palestinian leader will be able to uphold it? How do recent tensions between Fatah and Hamas factor into this?

Both Fatah and Hamas have reached agreements with Israel previously and have consistently abided by their respective terms.
 
Following its election to government, Hamas refused to abide by previous PLO-Israel accords, creating an obstacle to negotiations, but this can also be seen as a demonstration of the group’s principled approach in regards to agreements with Israel: In lieu of accepting past PLO agreements, Hamas showed a willingness to let Palestinian President and PLO chair Mahmoud Abbas conduct negotiations with Israel. The leadership indicated that any agreement reached by the two sides would be subjected to a general referendum, and if it passed a popular vote, the Hamas-led PA would also lend its endorsement.
 
This, unfortunately, was not the route taken. With the breakdown in Hamas-Fatah relations and after many months of violence, Hamas and Israel finally concluded the terms of a ceasefire in Gaza through behind-the-scenes contacts, and it has held together with major shows of restraint from both sides.

This ceasefire, of course, is not the agreement Hamas proposed to Israel for many months. According to their proposed hudna, Israel and Palestinian leaders would agree to a long-term ceasefire during which time both sides could bridge the gaps between them gradually, as only a period with no violence can allow.  

Despite their separate ideologies, both Fatah and Hamas have often shown, above all, a respect for the democratic system within which they operate (which is in fact a rarity in the Arab world) and their role as representatives of their people.  Should Palestinian voters be given the chance to achieve a durable peace, leaders from Fatah and Hamas would be compelled to follow through.  


Efforts to create a Palestinian unity government offer the best hope for a Palestinian polity capable both of reaching an agreement and maintaining it. Clear majorities of the general Palestinian public, including Hamas supporters, have said that they believe their government should negotiate a two-state solution with Israel; a unity government will have a broad enough basis to do just that.

Though some have suggested that Palestinian in-fighting is actually good for Israel, nothing could be further from the truth. Escalating violence could lead to civil war, which would not only bring ruin down on Palestinian society, but also become a real threat to Israeli security. Internecine violence in any context is often turned against outside forces, with each side attempting to prove greater loyalty to their own nation. This could easily result in “competing” Palestinian attacks against Israeli targets. Israeli expert Yossi Alpher, former senior advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Barak, recently wrote in the Forward that “the last thing Israel needs is a festering Somalia-like situation on its doorstep.” Serious diplomatic engagement – whether public or back-channel – would go a long way to averting just this scenario.


6.  If the majority of Palestinians are sincere in their desire for a two state solution, why was Hamas victorious in legislative elections in January 2006?

The victory of Hamas in legislative elections did not signify that the Palestinian population had rejected a resumption of negotiations with Israel, or that the majority of the population supported Islamic fundamentalism.  In fact, Palestinian public opinion after the election favored the continuation of the peace process and the implementation of the Bush-backed Road Map to Peace.   As many political experts (including those among the Palestinians themselves) explained at the time, Palestinian voters used the occasion of the elections to express their dissatisfaction with the failures and corruption of Fatah, the ruling party led by Yasser Arafat for many decades.  

Indeed, Hamas acknowledged the popularity of the diplomatic route and even showed a willingness to allow the moderate head of Fatah, PA President Mahmoud Abbas, to conduct negotiations with Israel.  This Palestinian formula for the resumption of negotiations quickly went nowhere, however, as Israel and the international community launched measures to isolate the PA as a whole, making negotiations with Abbas impossible until Hamas recognized Israel and met other conditions. In this tense political atmosphere Palestinians have supported Hamas’ position on Israel, if only not to bow to external pressures, while continuing to favor the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the West Bank and Gaza.  


7.  Is it too late for a two-state solution? Is a one-state solution a viable alternative to the two-state solution?

The ultimate goal of two viable, democratic states living side by side in peace still enjoys wide support from the U.S., the international community, and most importantly, (refer to polls) the majority of Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, past progress in negotiations demonstrates that such a resolution of the conflict remains entirely within reach.  

The idea of a single, bi-national state, however, has little popular backing among either Israelis or Palestinians and no political traction.  The international consensus is for a two-state solution. From an Israeli perspective, only a two-state solution is capable of preserving the state’s Jewish and democratic character, two values at the very core of the nation’s existence. From a Palestinian perspective, the national aspirations of the Palestinian people have not been diminished by decades of war, and remain centered on the establishment of their own independent state.

There are of course many obstacles to achieving a two-state resolution to the conflict, but creative solutions have already been found to even the most pressing problems. For example, in the case of Israel’s settlement of West Bank lands, the idea of a “land swap” has gained increasing currency. This arrangement would allow Israel to keep its largest settlements (comprising 4-5% of the West Bank) in exchange for Israeli land of similar equity adjacent to the West Bank. Many other arrangements for the achievement of a two-state solution have also already been made in principle; the Clinton Parameters , the Taba Agreement, and the Geneva Accord already constitute the fundamental aspects of an eventual two-state agreement.  Once the United States commits to playing a more active role in resolving the conflict, both sides can be encouraged to return to negotiations and fulfill the national aspirations of their peoples.

8. What is the position of the other Arab countries on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how can they contribute to its resolution?

The collective approach of the Arab states to the conflict is embodied in the Arab Peace Initiative launched by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and adopted later that year by the League’s 22 member states. The Initiative states that the Arab countries will “consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states in the region [and] establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace,” in return for Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in June 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The states of the Arab League – even those not allied with the U.S. – signed the Initiative, including Syria. Israeli officials have spoken favorably of the Initiative as providing a possible framework for a future agreement.

Egypt and Jordan already have formal peace agreements with Israel, consistently abiding by the treaties without any instances of non-compliance. Arab leaders in these states regularly act as mediators between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, in hopes of bridging differences between them for the sake of interim agreements and ceasefires, and ultimately, for achieving a two state solution.

9. Why is the US such an important player in the conflict and what can they do to bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians and how does it relate to the region in general?  

For the last half century, the United States has been the dominant power in Middle East diplomacy  and the major actors (Israel, Palestinians, other Arab states and Europe) have largely looked to the US for leadership.

In the past we have seen that a committed and sustained diplomatic effort by the U.S. is capable of expediting policies in Israel and among Palestinians that are capable of facilitating negotiations.  Likewise, it is also evident that when the U.S. disengages from active pursuit of diplomatic solutions, the cycle of violence intensifies and spirals toward chaos.  

Indeed, the U.S. role in the Middle East is inextricably bound to Israel’s stability and security. While this unswerving alliance can be seen in the billions of dollars in U.S. aid given to Israel every year, the willingness to support Israel in the halls of Congress, and in many instances of strategic partnership, the effect of this cooperation must also be expected by American Jews to serve the ultimate interest of the Jewish State: living at peace with its Arab neighbors.  

A coordinated effort to solve the conflict in conjunction with the international community – particularly the Quartet (U.S., E.U., U.N., and Russia) and moderate Arab states – would provide great dividends for America as well, as described in the Baker-Hamilton report of December 2006.  At stake for the U.S. are its position in Iraq, and its ability to effectively challenge Islamic fundamentalism in general.

Will solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict undermine support for fundamentalism in the Arab world? It is hard to say for sure, but it is unlikely that resolving the conflict will make Islamic fundamentalism disappear.  But by finally achieving peace and security between Israel and the Palestinians, moderate Arab and European states are more likely to unreservedly join Israel and the US in facing future threats from Islamic fundamentalists, such as from Iran and its nuclear ambitions. Moreover, it will remove from groups such as Hezbollah the political cover they have used in the past for their anti-Israeli activities.
 
10. Are there Arab and Palestinian peace groups comparable to Brit Tzedek v’Shalom?

Yes! There are many Arab and Palestinian groups in the occupied territories, Israel, and the US  working for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  They are comprised of volunteers, activists, former combatants and intellectuals dedicated to peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians. For a complete list of these groups with links to their websites visit http://btvshalom.org/links/links.shtml#PalestinianPeace.


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